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RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR AND ANTITRUST LAW: UNION COMBINATIONS WITH NoN-LABOR
GROUPS.-Small mine operators claimed a violation of the antitrust laws
by a coal miners union on the basis of an industry-wide collective bar-
gaining agreement, whereby employers and union agreed on a wage scale
exceeding the financial ability of some operators to pay. The wage de-
mands necessitated plant automation in order to continue competition.
Only the larger plants had the resources to finance automation and
smaller plants were forced out of business. The district court awarded
damages. The court of appeals affirmed and certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, although reversing on other grounds held that union
combinations with non-labor groups were not exempt from the provisions
of the antitrust laws. The minority said that since the conduct was within
the area of mandatory collective bargaining, it should not come within
the courts jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. United Mine Workers of
America v. James M. Pennington et al. 85 Sup. Ct. 1585 (1965).
Operators of a chain of retail stores in the Chicago area brought
action against defendant labor union and the association of food retailers
representing independent food stores, alleging violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. The United States District Court entered judgment in
favor of the defendants, the court of appeals reversed, and the union
petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Held,
multi-employer agreement with unions were within the labor exemption
to the Sherman Antitrust Act since the agreement concerned traditional
areas of collective bargaining. The minority said that the case should be
decided in accord with the Pennington case. Local Union No. 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America AFL-CIO
et. al. v. Jewel Tea Company Inc. 85 Sup. Ct. 1596 (1965).
Union activity is usually exempted from operation of the antitrust
laws.' However, as indicated by Pennington and Jewel Tea, when unions
combine with non-union groups to restrain trade, antitrust laws may be
applied. The fundamental policy underlying both the antitrust laws and
labor legislation is promotion of the free flow of commerce and the elim-
ination of restraints on the product market. 2 Although collective bar-
gaining may result in the imposition of such restraint, it nevertheless
has been recognized to be in the public interest.8
More than fifty years after the enactment of the Sherman Act, an
interpretation of existing law was given in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.4
'For further discussion of labor's exemption see Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-
A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Frank, The Myth of the
Conflict between Antitrust Laws and Labor Law in the Application of the Antitrust
Laws to Union Activity, 69 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1964); Winter, Collective Bargaining
and Competition, The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activity, 73 YALE
L. J. 14 (1963).
'See, National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 49 Stat. 449-457 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 151-61 (1959); Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1,
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141-59 (1958); Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum Griffin Act) § 2, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 151-68
(1959).
FOROSCH, A TREATISE oN LABOR LAW 280 (2d ed. 1965).
'Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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In that case a union, by violence, took control of a factory in an attempt
to achieve a closed shop. This action limited the interstate commerce
shipment of the hosiery produced at the plant. The Court, after analyzing
the history of antitrust legislation, said that the end sought by the Sher-
man Act "was the prevention of restraints to free competition in busi-
ness and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices, or otherwise control the market to the detriment of pur-
chasers or consumers of goods and services."5 The Court concluded that
the activity of the union had no substantial effect on the market price,
was not intended to have such effect, and did not come within the Court's
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
The next year the Court took a dofferent approach in United States
v. Hutcheson,6 which announced a sweeping exemption of unions from the
antitrust laws. This case involved an alleged antitrust violation arising
out of a peaceful strike and secondary boycott by a union in controversy
with another union over jobs. Mr. Justice Frankfurter construed the
provisions of the Sherman, Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia acts together
to arrive at the majority position.7 According to Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, the Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the fetter upon trade union
activities left virtually untouched by the Clayton Act. This was accom-
plished by narrowing further the circumstances under which the federal
court could grant injunctions in labor disputes. More specifically, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act explicitly formulated the "public policy of the
United States" in regard to industrial conflict, and established that the
allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted to the immediate
employer-employee relation.8 The majority read the Clayton Act as
exempting from antitrust action the following subjects of labor disputes:
[A]ny controversy concerning terms or- conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in nego-
tiating... terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in proximate relations of employer and
employee. 9
The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to restore the
broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton
Act, but which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly re-
strictive judicial construction.'0 The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted
the original purpose of the Clayton Act by infusing into it specific allow-
able trade union activities. Under section twenty of the Clayton Act no
such allowable conduct may be held to be a "violation of any law of the
United States,"" including the Sherman Act.12 Mr. Justice Stone's con-
6Id. at 493.





1138 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. 52 (1955). Section 20 provides:
That no restraining order or Injunction shall be granted. . .in any case between
employer and employees. . .involving. . .a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
[Vol. 27,
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curring opinion in Hutcheson reaffirmed his position in the Apex case,
where he held that the Sherman Act applied when restraint did or could
operate to suppress the competition in the market. 13 Mr. Justice Stone
and the other concurring justices felt that the application of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in the case was doubtful.
14
A limitation to the sweeping decision in the Hutcheson case was
announced in Allen Bradley Company v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers.'5 This case arose out of a conspiracy between union,
contractors, and manufacturers in the city of New York. Unions through
picketing and boycotts prevented non-union sales of electrical equip-
ment. Manufacturers raised prices; and contractors set bids at high
levels. The activity was directed toward, and resulted in, control of the
market price of the goods.' 6 The Court, after a review of the antitrust
acts and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as interpreted by Apex and Hutche-
son, found two declared congressional policies which necessitated reconcilia-
tion. One sought to preserve a competitive business economy, and the
other sought to preserve the right of labor to better its conditions
through the agency of collective bargaining.' 7  The acts by the union
were held to violate the Sherman Act, although they were not unlawful
under the Clayton Act. The Court went on to assert that if such activity
had been performed alone, it would not have been wrongful. Further,
the Court indicated "A business monopoly is no less such because a union
participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act."' 8
The three cases summarized above were decided at a time when the
unions had great freedom to act and were strongly supported by the gov-
ernment. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 constituted a clear
statement of a national policy in support of union activity and objec-
tives.19 The employers under the National Labor Relations Act were re-
stricted by an enumerations of unfair labor practices, which related only
to employer conduct. 20 The current policy approach to labor organiza-
tion and activity is not as favorable to the union. The Taft-Hartley
employment. . . .And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person
or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do ...
"United States v. Hutcheson, supra note 6, at 236.
1Id. at 240.
"Id. at 237, "an application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which is not free from
doubt and which some of my brethren sharply challenge."'





"National Labor Relations Act, supra note 2.
"'The following unfair Labor practices of employers were set forth by the Act:
1. Interference, restraint, or coercion of employees;
2. Domination or interference with formation or administration of labor organization;
3. Discrimination due to membership in labor organization;
4. Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee for filing charges or
giving testimony under this act;
5. Refusal to bargain collectively.
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amendments to the National Labor Relations Act attempted to equalize
the imbalance created by the original act, by defining unfair practices
on the part of labor unions.21 The Landrum-Griffin Act enumerated other
activities of unions which were considered unfair by Congress.2 2 There-
fore, although labor legislation has maintained a consistent policy of
promoting the free flow of commerce, successive labor enactments have
modified the scope of allowable employer-employee activity.23
By the Pennington and Jewel Tea cases, the Court has attempted to
interpret the existing cases and legislation. The three positions of the
Pennington case and the three position in the Jewel Tea case indicate some
confusion in this interpretation. The majority position in Pennington,
written by Mr. Justice White, cites Apex, Hutcheson, and Allen Bradley
with favor, recognizing that the exemption of unions from the operation
of the antitrust laws was modified by the later case.24 Mr. Justice White
also recognized that labor statutes have been established to control union
activities. The majority position, however, provides for a degree of judi-
cial control by means of the antitrust laws alone, without regard to the
labor statutes. The majority limits the allowable activities of a union or
an employer in a wage dispute. The court held that collective bargaining
agreements may restrain trade or eliminate competition among employ-
ers within a bargaining unit, without antitrust sanctions. However, the
union is subject to antitrust restrictions when it agrees to impose a cer-
tain wage scale on other bargaining unit. The majority emphasized the
necessity of good faith and candidness for effective collective bar-
gaining. 25
The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas in the Pennington
case reaffirms the language of the Allen Bradley decision, holding that
the combination of union, contractors, and manufacturers is a business
monopoly. Labor should be subject to the same sanctions as a business
group when it joins such a monopoly.26
The majority opinion in the Jewel Tea case, also written by Mr. Jus-
tice White, indicates that there must be a weighing of the interests in-
volved. It is necessary to balance the "apparent and real" effect on com-
petition against the "immediate and direct" concern of the union mem-
bers.27 In the Jewel Tea case, the agreement limited marketing to
between the hours of 9:00 A. M. and 6:00 P. M. The Court held that the
interest of the union should control and this agreement should be al-
lowed.28 According to the dissent, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, the
Allen Bradley doctrine should apply, making the agreement a violation of
"Labor Management Relations Act, supra note 2.
"Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, supra note 2.
uSee upra note 2.
"85 Sup. Ct. 1591-92.
Id. at 1591.
"Id. at 1595.
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the Sherman Act since the contract was aimed at prohibiting the mar-
keting of goods and services. 29
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, dis-
sented from the Pennington opinion, but concurred in the judgment of the
Jewel Tea case.30 The rationale of Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in Pen-
nington was that Hutcheson and Apex gave a broad exemption to labor
activities, and that current labor laws use an approach different from the
antitrust laws in dealing with the questions involved. Justice Goldberg's
opinion states that to completely protect mandatory collective bargain-
ing from judicial interference, would effectuate the congressional policy
of encouraging free collective bargaining subject only to specific re-
strictions contained in the labor laws. To allow intervention under the
Sherman Act would place on judges and juries the determination of
"what public policy in regard to industrial struggle demands." 31
The question to be resolved is whether the Court in the present de-
cision has interpreted antitrust and labor laws in accord with the needs
of contemporary society. The rules set forth should be applicable to
activity in the market place and should set guidelines for future litiga-
tion. The opinions by Justices Douglas and Goldberg represent divergent
positions. One would give a blanket freedom to the activities of labor
unions under the Sherman Act. The other would regard the Allen Bradleq
decision as bringing any collective bargaining agreement within the
scrutiny of the Court as a possible violation of the Sherman Act.32 Mr.
Justice White bridges these positions by setting definite limitations upon
the application of Allen Bradley. Not all collective bargaining agree-
ments would come within its coverage, but only those in which an agree-
ment is made by the union to impose restraints outside the bargaining
unit.33 By this approach, the agreements within the bargaining unit are
left to the regulations of labor statutes. When an agreement is made to
go outside the bargaining unit, the Court would be allowed to examine
it with reference to the antitrust laws and the interest of the unions. Mr.
Justice White's approach might be called a joint judicial and adminis-
trative approach.
Justice Goldberg's dissent in Pennington, however, does merit discus-
sion. The National Labor Relations Act and the amending Taft-Hartley
and Landrum-Griffin Acts could be interpreted as labor antitrust laws.
since the provisions of these acts are in line with the policy aproach to
the area. These acts, by creating the National Labor Relations Board,
utilize an administrative approach to labor controversies.3 4 In an area
as highly volatile as that of labor law, perhaps the administrative ap-
proach is the most satisfactory. The structure of the National Labor Re-
-'Id. at 1606.
• 'Id. at 1607-28.
1MId. at 1615.
"These positions are also discussed in the articles in note 1, supra.
33A len Bradley Company v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, supra
note 1, at 811.
"FoRioscH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 295.
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lations Board enables it to maintain a close supervision of labor activity.
The power of subpoena allows the board to look at the market place and
its demands in light of the underlying policy favoring a free flow of
commerce.3 5 Specific abuses are and can be outlined by Congress in order
to prevent general interference with the institution of collective bar-
gaining. The Board has the quasi-judicial power to interpret and apply
legislative provisions. However, in the area of collective bargaining the
union power may be combined with that of management. This necessi-
tates greater supervision than provided for by the labor statutes. As in-
dicated by the decisions in the principal cases, the Supreme Court will
recognize the power of the National Labor Relations Board, but will take
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws in certain cases.
It is submitted that adherence to the tests announced in the Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea cases sufficiently limits the Allen Bradley doc-
trine.3 6 The limitation brings within the Court's jurisdiction only those
cases in which agreements imposing restraints extend beyond the bar-
gaining unit. However, the collective bargaining agreements falling
within a bargaining unit are to be controlled by the administrative
method set up by the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments.
This approach will best promote the policies of the Sherman Act and of
the labor statutes. A joint judicial and administrative approach to union
antitrust activity would allow flexibility in reflecting the demands of
the market place. Such joint effort is at the heart of our constitutional
system and would promote effective government and a sound economy.
J. DWAINE ROYBAL
WATER RIGHTS: UTAH ADJUDICATION EMPHASIZES FEDERAL-STATE CON-
FLICT.-The Utah state engineer joined the United States as a necessary
party defendant in a water adjudication of the Green River. Although
the lower court recognized the claim of the UnitedStates to water rights
purchased from private individuals, it refused to'recognize claims to
additional unspecified water rights. The United States appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court contending that the adjudicated water rights of
individuals should be subject to the right of the United States to use all
the water necessary for national forest reservations. Held, affirmed. The
United States is bound by the decree to the same extent as any other
party. "Therefore, any water rights which have been or could have
been claimed within this adjudication are now concluded by it." Green
River Adjudication v. United States, 404 P.2d 251 (Utah 1965).
The states claim control of all water rights within their boundaries.'
"Id. at 305, 394.
uFor a discussion of the lengths to which the Court might have gone with the Allen
Bradley decision see Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and
Allen Bradley, 13 LAD. L. J. 957 (1962).
'Fed. Power Comm'n. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
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